Abstract A language in which we can express arithmetic and which contains its own satisfaction predicate (in the style of Kripke's theory of truth) can be formulated using just two nonlogical primitives: (the successor function) and Sat (a satisfaction predicate).
satisfies nor falsifies Sat(t 0 , . . . t i ) with s. We evaluate nonatomic formulas using the Strong Kleene scheme. Thus:
Similarly:
Finally:
) for some (every) sequence r such that, for j = i, s( j) = r( j).
We let ( A ∧ B) abbreviate ¬(¬ A ∨ ¬B).
Say that sequence s extends n 0 , . . . ,
We will be interested in those interpretations of L in which Sat can be understood as expressing a satisfaction predicate for the language. Assume that we have a Gödel numbering of the formulas of L by the natural numbers (we place no further restrictions on the Gödel numbering-it can even be nonrecursive). We say that 
(where is the empty set). It follows that has fixed points, including a smallest fixed point. 1 We need to define the notion of definability in a partially interpreted language.
We say that an i-place
s which extend elements of R. R is strongly defined by A iff it is weakly defined by A and N i − R is weakly defined by ¬ A. R is weakly (strongly) definable iff it is weakly (strongly) definable by some formula. A function is said to be strongly definable iff its graph is. (To handle definability of a set, S, of numbers, we treat S as a set of 1-tuples and let n = n.)
Theorem 1 Every relation definable in the first order language of arithmetic (with vocabulary:
= and , it will suffice to show that the relations x = 0, x + y = z, and x × y = z are strongly definable. x = 0 is of course definable by ¬∃y(x = y ). We show that addition is definable as follows. Consider the formula:
Suppose the Gödel number of this formula is m. Let Sum(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) be the formula Sat(m, x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , m) (which in turn abbreviates the formula ∃x 6 (¬∃x
strongly defines the addition function. We prove this by induction. Suppose that we are given n 0 . We first need to show that for each n 1 and n 2 ,
which, by the induction hypothesis, holds iff n 0 + (k + 1) = n 2 .
We next need to show that
The proof is again by induction, only now we replace |= with =|, ∈ S 1 with ∈ S 2 , and = n 2 with = n 2 . The case is similar for ×. Take the formula:
Suppose that this formula has Gödel number k. Sat(k, x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , k) defines × in any fixed point. The proof is parallel to the case for addition.
Remark 2
Note that the satisfaction predicate is used in the above proof only in the form Sat(t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) . We could have let L contain just a 5-place predicate Sat(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) in addition to . Then, given the theorem, the language will contain adequate resources to code finite sequences and talk about its own syntax. One will then be able to define a more general notion of satisfaction as a relation between a Gödel number for a formula and a code for a finite sequence. The approach taken in the paper is simpler and less artificial.
Remark 3
The proof also works if we use the van Fraassen supervaluation scheme instead of the Strong Kleene scheme. On the other hand, the proof will not go through if the Weak Kleene scheme is used. This is so because any formula of the form . . . ∃x(. . . Sat(x, . . .) . . . will be paradoxical (i.e., neither satisfied nor falsified in any fixed point by any sequence) since for some instances Sat(x, . . .) is undefined (e.g., instances in which the value of x is a paradoxical sentence).
Remark 4
Of course the strength of the fixed point languages go well beyond that of arithmetic, since they contain their own satisfaction predicates. So, for example, in the minimal fixed point the 1 1 relations are weakly defined and the hyperarithmetical relations are strongly defined. 2 
NOTES
1. Of course there will be no fixed point in which Sat is totally defined. The formula ¬Sat(x 0 , x 0 ) (cf., "x 0 is heterological") will be neither satisfied nor falsified by its own Gödel number in any fixed point. On the other hand, Sat(x 0 , x 0 ) (cf., "x 0 is autological") will sometimes be satisfied by its own Gödel number, sometimes falsified by it, and sometimes neither satisfied nor falsified by it.
2. The basic trick involved in the proof of the theorem (the construction of appropriate selfreferential formulas without the use of a substitution function) came to me while contemplating remarks of Kripke on diagonalization and the recursion theorem. It has been brought to my attention that Visser [2] , pp. 666-667 also uses this trick in his proof of the "Prediagonal Lemma for SAT," though he does so while considering a language in which it is already given that a pairing function is available and Sat expresses a two-place relation between a Gödel number for a formula and a code for a finite sequence.
